# B1 Completion Audit v001 Status: **CANDIDATE · B1 COMPLETION AUDIT · NO B2 UI · NO B3 BRIDGE · NO VPS MUTATION** Baseline commit: `caa4788e6e1d1e060b5c66517c5fd82a014b0e59` (`target-v2/b1-hardening`) Assignment: `B1_COMPLETION_AUDIT_ASSIGNMENT_v001.md` ## Review method Re-read B1 assignment/handoff, B1 hardening handoff, B0 Platform Core handoff, and B0.UI schema-to-view matrix. Inspected migration SQL, `migrate.ts`, repositories, backup path, and Hub domain tests directly. Did not trust prior handoff claims without code/test verification. ## Checked contract items (15) | # | Required scope item | Verdict | |---|---|---| | 1 | Ordered SQL migrations with checksum + deterministic schema versioning | PASS (001 retained; 002 added for immutability triggers; atomic apply + ledger) | | 2 | Exactly 38 Hub relations including `employee_workspaces` | PASS | | 3 | Composite/same-project FK enforcement + required indexes | PASS | | 4 | Four catalog tables only (employees, employee_versions, memberships, runtime_bindings) | PASS | | 5 | Roles labels / Skills typed refs / capabilities code-owned | PASS | | 6 | Direct accountability + one planned assignee/reviewer per Task | PASS | | 7 | `run_actors` observation only | PASS | | 8 | `tasks.active_mission_id` + reservations + generation fencing | PASS | | 9 | Context/version/artifact/authorization/history/idempotency/integration/access foundation | PASS after fix (tables existed; typed seams were incomplete) | | 10 | `employee_workspaces` scope/provisioning identity, no raw Drive tokens | PASS | | 11 | Typed repository layer + transaction boundaries | PASS after fix | | 12 | principals/sessions/grants persistence | PASS | | 13 | Deterministic command idempotency + optimistic revision checks | PASS | | 14 | Backup foundation via SQLite Online Backup | PASS | | 15 | Isolation / FK / revision / grants / reservation / long-poll tests | PASS (expanded) | ## Concrete gaps found / fixed | ID | Severity | Finding | Disposition | |---|---|---|---| | A1 | Defect | Context/artifact/authorization/history/integration durable facts had SQL tables but no typed repository seams, so B1 item 9 was not mechanically enforceable/testable beyond table creation. | Fixed: added `registerArtifact`, `approveContextVersion`, `pinContextBundle`, `createMissionScope`, `recordAuthorization`, `appendBusinessEvent`, `recordBoundaryOperation`, `acceptInboxReceipt`, `registerWorker`, `createEmployeeVersion`. | | A2 | Defect | `context_bundles` and `business_events` could be UPDATEd/DELETEd via raw SQL despite immutability/append semantics; artifact digests could be rewritten. | Fixed: migration `002_hub_immutability` adds fail-closed triggers (no 39th relation). | | A3 | Gap | Inbox receipt replay-vs-conflict and worker durable identity lacked repository + regression coverage. | Fixed: helpers + tests (same-hash replay / different-hash conflict; worker key scope conflict). | | A4 | Gap | Context bundle pinning and same-project artifact membership lacked focused tests. | Fixed: domain regression tests for pin replay/conflict, digest immutability, cross-project context artifact FK rejection, authorization same-project binding. | No 39th Hub relation added. No B2/B3/Drive OAuth/Work auth/queue/VPS scope opened. ## Migration checksums | Version | SHA-256 | |---|---| | `001_hub_foundation` | `9150c549deb341c63ef07472fad22fc0ff90c7400696bde8e567e0bbe24ce48e` | | `002_hub_immutability` | `8186a95d572f07f9f9d713cc116eda59d777e4723f933be5598711cc6d1720a7` | Checksum basis: UTF-8 SQL with LF newlines. ## Exact tests added / strengthened Domain (`test/domain.test.ts`): - empty-DB apply now expects both `001_hub_foundation` and `002_hub_immutability`; - re-open checksum verification covers both ledger rows; - project-scoped artifact register + digest immutability trigger; - context version artifact membership + cross-project FK rejection; - context bundle pin replay / different-manifest conflict + UPDATE immutability; - business event append + UPDATE/DELETE append-only rejection; - authorization bound to in-project mission scope; - inbox receipt replay vs payload-hash conflict; - boundary operation insert seam; - worker registration identity + cross-scope conflict; - employee_version catalog seam. ## Relation / forbidden-table checks - Manifest remains exactly **38** (`HUB_RELATION_COUNT`). - Forbidden absences unchanged: `roles`, `skills`, `capabilities`, `responsibilities`, `task_reservations`. - Suite asserts empty-DB apply → 38 relations and forbidden-table absence (passed). ## Verification evidence — PLAN — 2026-09-18 From `target-v2/foundation` (clean sequence executed): ```powershell cd target-v2/foundation npm ci npm run lint npm run typecheck npm test npm run build npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high ``` Also: ```powershell git diff --check ``` Results: | Check | Result | |---|---| | `npm ci` | PASS | | `npm run lint` | PASS | | `npm run typecheck` | PASS | | `npm test` | PASS — 7 files / **50** tests | | `npm run build` | PASS (web + hub) | | `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` | PASS — **0** vulnerabilities (0 HIGH/CRITICAL) | | `git diff --check` | PASS | | Relation count | **38** | | Forbidden tables absent | PASS | ## Deferred / explicit non-claims Intentionally **not** implemented (out of B1 / deferred): - B2 production UI/API vertical slice; - B3 PLAN bridge / native whole-Mission execution; - real Google Drive OAuth/API folder provisioning; - Work auth; - Redis/Temporal/queue/generic orchestrator; - VPS/nginx/DNS mutation; - legacy AA orchestration changes; - full product CRUD for every Hub relation beyond the durable-fact seams required by B1 (e.g. decisions/blockers/results UI workflows remain B2+); - treating role labels, profile text, skill refs, or Drive content as capability authority (still non-authoritative per B0 policy evaluator). ## Hand-off boundary Completion here is implementation self-check only. Independent QA and Human Owner acceptance remain separate. Do not start B2 or B3 from this candidate.